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Abstract
Economists have offered a number of explanations on the introduction of monetary
incentives within firms. These range from the classical agency model to the impact exerted
by factors such as monitoring technology, influence activity and organizational structure.
Numerous empirical contributions have recently provided evidence on part of this literature,
especially as concerned the trade−off between incentives and insurance. However there is
still much to do in order to offer a complete picture of firm's incentive system. The purpose
of this paper is to provide a test to factors that have been usually underrepresented in
empirical work but that may be key in favoring or inhibiting the introduction of performance
bonuses.
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Economists have oﬀered a number of explanations on the introduction of mone-
tary incentives within ﬁrms. These range from the classical agency model to the
impact exerted by factors such as monitoring technology, inﬂuence activity and
performance measurement (for a recent review see Gibbons 1998). Numerous
empirical contributions have recently provided evidence on part of this litera-
ture, especially as concerned the trade-oﬀ between incentives and insurance (see
Aggarval and Samwick 1999. See also Prendergast 19 9 6f o rar e v i e wo fe m p i r i c a l
evidence on compensation policies). However there is still much to do in order
to oﬀer a complete picture of ﬁrm’s incentive system.
The purpose of this paper is to provide a test to factors that have been
usually underrepresented in empirical work but that may be key in favoring or
inhibiting the introduction of monetary incentives. In particular, Politecnico
di Milano and University of Pavia have recently conducted an empirical survey
on the organization of plants whose data allow me to test the role played by
a number of organizational factors that are usually tackled in theoretical work
but not in empirical research. I am aware that this represents only a ﬁrst
step towards a more complete analysis of a ﬁrm’s incentive structure. However,
information at disposal gives me an unique occasion to introduce in the empirical
literature new determinants of the decision of adopting monetary incentives.
As an introductionary remark it is worth noticing that Italian labor legis-
lation has two contractual negotiation levels: national and local. While at the
national level trade-unions and employers negotiate the base salary, at company
level bonuses and incentive schemes are deﬁned by a bargaining process between
ﬁrm management and workers. In particular, a ﬁrm management may or may
not decide to introduce bonuses. Moreover, bonuses may be linked to measures
of individual and/or team performance. In this paper I do not deal with the
determination of the base salary but I concentrate on the determinants of the
introduction of team and individual bonuses.
The remaining part of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 I brieﬂy
illustrate, by looking at economic theory, how the structure of incentives depends
on some characteristics of ﬁrm’s technological and organizational structure. Sec-
tion 3 presents the empirical survey upon which this paper is based. Moreover,
I illustrate measures that capture aspects such as ﬁrm and plant organizational
structure, eﬃciency of monitoring technology and allocation of decision-making
activity. These allow me, in Section 4, to test, through the estimates of four
duration models, the eﬀect of these and other explanatory variables upon the
decision to introduce team and individual monetary incentives within sample
ﬁrms.
12 Agency models: monitoring technology, inﬂu-
ence activity and performance measurement
I start by using a version of the Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987) linear principal-
agent model. Then I look at some extensions that take into account important
factors that may inﬂuence the structure of incentives. In particular I shall focus
upon monitoring technology, inﬂuence activities and performance measurement.
2.1 Traditional setting: incentives versus insurance
Assume that there are n identical risk averse employees and one risk neutral
principal (the owner). An employee takes an unobservable action e, whilst the
principal observes a random signal
ˆ e = e + ², E(²)=0 ,var(²)=σ2
²
where σ2
² is the variance of the observation error.
The employee’s total pay w is given by
w = S + b(e +ˆ e),
where S is a ﬁxed wage and b is the piece rate (premium rate).
Employees are assumed to have the same mean-variance utility function with
convex disutility of eﬀort ke2
2 . If we assume constant return to workers and an
expected output per employee proportional to eﬀort, say ae, by solving ﬁrm’s




So, if r =0(agents are risk neutral) and a =1 , then we obtain the stan-
dard result b =1 . The employees’ payment performance sensitivity is clearly
a decreasing function of the variance on the measure of performance (σ2
²), the
coeﬃcient of risk aversion (r), and the curvature of the employees’ disutility of
eﬀort function (k). Also, it is increasing in the productivity of workers (a).
FitzRoy and Kraft (1995) extend this model to take into account ﬁrm’s
monitoring technology. In particular, they assume that the observation-error
variance is reduced by monitoring expenditure. Thus, higher monitoring ex-
penditure reduces observation-error variance and increases optimal piece rate.
Moreover, given monitoring technology, complexity of observation of employees’
eﬀort is linked to the complexity of tasks and to the industrial environment. The
optimal piece rate is a negative function of exogenous complexity of observation
of employees’ performance.
22.2 Inﬂuence activity
Perri (1994) develops previous framework taking into account inﬂuence activity
(Milgrom 1988). In this case the principal observes an imperfect signal which
is aﬀected by employees’ inﬂuence activity i
ˆ e = e + i + ².
This signal is adjusted for expected inﬂuence activity ˆ ı, so that total pay is
w = S + b(e + i −ˆ ı + ²).
In this setting, even if employees’ inﬂuence activity is anticipated by the
principal, it will be rational to engage in such activity because the principal
expects the agents to behave opportunistically. In other words, given principal
expectations, if i<ˆ ı,t h e nE(w) <S+be. Agents’ costs (of eﬀort and inﬂuence)
a r ea s s u m e dt ob ec o n v e xa n dg i v e nb yke2
2 + uki2
2 ,w h e r eu is a parameter of
the cost of inﬂuence.




The employees’ payment performance sensitivity is an increasing function
of the cost of inﬂuence. The higher this cost, the lower employees’ inﬂuence
activity i.W h e ni n ﬂuence is costly, employees will not be tempted to engage in
these activities. In this case the principal will ﬁnd convenient to link payment
to performance. Otherwise, employees will be tempted to inﬂuence the signal
of ﬁrm value. Thus, the principal will avoid to link compensation to ﬁrm value.
2.3 Performance measurement
Classic agency model assumes that principal’s objective is always a contractible
performance measure. However, this is often not the case. The inability to use
total value as the basis of incentive contracts may lead to “the folly of rewarding
A, while hoping for B”. Let us follow Baker (1992). Assume agents’ risk neu-
trality (i.e., r =0 ) and deﬁne P(e,²) as a measure of individual performance,
and V (e,²) ﬁrm value.






3where ρ is correlation between the marginal product of eﬀort on value (Ve)
and that on performance measure (Pe), σVe is standard deviation of Ve and σPe
is standard deviation of Pe.
Equation (3) shows that the correlation between the marginal product of
eﬀort and of value is key in the determination of optimal premium rate. The
higher this correlation, the higher the piece rate: “If these marginal products
are not strongly correlated, then the agent’s eﬀort choice will not match the
principal’s desired eﬀort level in most states. Because the agent’s disutility of
eﬀort function is convex, choosing the wrong level of eﬀort is costly. In response,
to this cost, the principal reduces the piece rate and reduces incentives” (Baker
1992, pg. 606).
3D a t a
In this paper we use information on the organization of plants and their parent
companies for a sample composed of 438 Italian manufacturing plants and for the
period 1975-1997. In particular, Politecnico di Milano and Università di Pavia
have designed a questionnaire analysis on Italian manufacturing plants aimed
at collecting data on the organization of plants and on technology adoptions
(see Colombo and Delmastro 1999 for a more detailed description of collected
information on the organization and some descriptive evidence).
Information on sample plants provided by the survey and relevant to the
purpose of the present paper includes:
i) the eventual use of a bonus system based on measures of individual and/or
team performance;
ii) a detailed description of plants’ decision-making structure. More precisely,
for a series of strategic decisions I know the hierarchical level that is responsible
and how the decision is made (see again Colombo and Delmastro 1999);
iii) the year of adoption by each plant of advanced manufacturing technologies
such as on-line connection with headquarters, and of innovative management
techniques such as rotation of productive workers;
iv) plant size (i.e. number of employees), sector of operation and ownership
status.
3.1 Explanatory variables
In order to test predictions of economic theory presented in section 2, I consid-
ered a set of explanatory variables which are illustrated in what follows. Table
1 reports deﬁnitions of explanatory variables.
As to monitoring technology, I introduced the time-varying dummy variable
MONITORING TECHNOLOGY which is 1 for plants that by year t-1 had
adopted intra-ﬁrm network technology (i.e. LAN and on-line connection with
headquarters). Advances in information technology enable managers to access
to timely information about production and reduce the variance on the measure
of performance (see Hubbard 1998). These increase the ability of managers to
4collect and process information on a plant’s operations and decrease principal’s
costs of investigation. Therefore, advances in communication technology by re-
ducing the variance on the measure of employees performance should lead to
an increase in the use of team and individual bonuses (see equation 1). On
the contrary, other things equal (i.e. monitoring technology), a more complex
environment reduces principal capacity to eﬀectively monitor plant employees,
thus induces more variance on the measure of performance. Industries char-
acterized by a high level of scientiﬁcb a s ea r el i k e l yt os u ﬀer from strong in-
formational asymmetries between the agents and the principal. The variable
R&D, which is the proportion of R&D employees to total employment by a
three-digit NACE-CLIO industry classiﬁcation, is a measure of complexity of
technological environment (note that each plant has been assigned to the in-
dustry which accounts for the largest proportion of its output). According to
equation (1), I would thus expect R&D to negatively inﬂuence the likelihood of
a plant introducing monetary incentives.
Since equation (1) shows that there should exist a strong link between plant
employees’ productivity and the optimal piece rate, I introduced a number of
variables that may capture this eﬀect. JOB SHOP is a dummy variable which
indicates, when equal to one, plants that are characterized by job-shop kinds of
operations. Instead, when plants are involved in line production this variable
assumes value equal to 0. More interestingly, I consider advanced manufacturing
technologies (AMTs) to which the recent empirical literature on technological
change has devoted considerable attention (see for instance Dunne 1994). In
particular I focus on the following AMTs: ﬂexible manufacturing systems and
cells (FMSs), machining centers, NC and CNC stand-alone machine tools, and
programmable robots. As all such technologies pertain to the production sphere,
they directly aﬀect production processes and consequently the organization of
plants. I also want to test the existence of a “cluster eﬀect”: AMTs may
aﬀect the productivity of workers, thus the introduction of monetary incentives,
especially when they are introduced together rather than in isolation. For this
purpose, I have deﬁned three time-varying dummy variables: AMT1, AMT2
and AMT34 equal 1 for plants which by year t-1 had adopted 1,2 and 3 or 4
AMTs, respectively.
In addition, I considered time dependent dummy variables regarding the
introduction of the following human resource management practices (HRMPs):
quality circles, just-in-time and job rotation. HRMP1 and HRMP23 equal 1
for plants which by year t-1 had adopted 1 and 2 or 3 HRMPs, respectively.
In the year following adoption they are switched to 1. These work policies
are at the core of recent empirical (Ichniowski et al. 1997) and theoretical
research on the organization of ﬁrms (Kandel and Lazear 1992). This body of
literature argues that the introduction of managerial innovations is part of a new
organizational paradigm characterized by greater decentralization of decision-
making activities, multitasking (rather than specialization of tasks), reduced
bureaucratization and use of monetary incentives (see for instance Lindbeck
and Snower 2000). In this respect, Holmstrom and Milgrom (1994) maintain
that incentive schemes and other human resources management practices should
5covary in cross-sectional data.
Turning attention to inﬂuence activity, I expect its extent within a plant to
be closely linked with the characteristics of decision-making (see Milgrom and
Roberts 1988). Collected data include the managerial level that is responsible
over the decision concerning plant’s incentive procedures (i.e. introduction and
deﬁnition of bonus systems and other monetary incentives). The time-varying
dummy variable PLANT MANAGER is 1 when real but not formal authority
over this decision is assigned to the plant manager, whilst is 0 when it is central-
ized at a higher hierarchical level (i.e. the owner in single-plant ﬁrms or a plant
manager’s corporate superior in multi-plant organizations). As they involve the
presentation of evidence, inﬂuence activities provide decision makers with infor-
mation that helps them to take decisions. As the objectives of the organization
and the plant employees taking part to the negotiation diverge, it is likely there
will be too much inﬂuence activity (Inderst et al. 2000). As long as the plant
manager works inside the plant, he or she enjoys an informational advantage
with respect to his/her corporate superior(s). In this case, plant employees will
ﬁnd more costly to alter information concerning plant value and their perfor-
mance. Note also that inﬂuence activities are high when they are likely to be
successful. The decentralization of real but not formal authority to the plant
manager and thus the possibility of overruling his/her decisions are means by
which the superior exploits informational advantage of plant manager and re-
duces inﬂuence activities of plant employees (due to both a low discretionary
power of the plant manager and a closure of direct communication channels
assured by the distance between plant manager’s corporate superior, who works
outside the plant, and plant employees). According to equation (2), when in-
ﬂuence activity is more costly then the ﬁrm will ﬁnd convenient to introduce
monetary incentives. Thus I would expect a positive impact of PLANT MAN-
AGER on the probability of introducing team and individual bonuses.
SINGLE-PLANT is a dummy variable that intends to distinguish establish-
ments owned by a multi-plant organization from single-plant ﬁrms. In single-
plant organizations the ﬁrm and the plant output coincide, while in multi-plant
ﬁrms plant output represents only a proportion of the overall production of the
group. Everything being equal, correlation between the marginal product of
eﬀort of plant employees on ﬁrm value and that on performance measurement
declines as the number of plants increases. Thus I would expect single-plant or-
ganizations to be more likely to introduce incentive schemes based on measures
of team and/or individual performance (see equation 3).
Finally, I included plant- and regional-speciﬁc control variables.
At plant level, I included both the variable SIZE which is the logarithm of
the number of plant employees, and SKILL which is the percentage of plant
employees with a high-school leaving certiﬁcate or higher degree. In addition,
I included UNIONIZATION, which is the regional value of workers’ unioniza-
tion rate. This variable allows me to control for the inﬂuence of employees’
bargaining power in the deﬁnition of ﬁrm’s compensation policy.
63.2 Results
Table 2 presents the results of two right-censored Exponential duration models
(recall that the period under scrutiny is 1975-1997)1. The dependent variables
are given by two time-varying dummy variables which equal 1 for plants that
by year t had adopted team (Model I) or individual (Model II) compensation
schemes. In Model I the dependent variable is thus the duration needed to
introduce bonuses based on measures of team performance, while in Model II
is the duration needed to introduce bonuses based on measures of individual
performance.
Generally speaking, the results of econometric estimates are robust and sup-
port the hypotheses presented in previous sections. In order to assess the joint
contribution of explanatory variables to the ﬁt of the models, I have proceeded
to run chi-square tests (reported at the bottom of Table 2) for the joint hypothe-
sis that all coeﬃcients apart from the constant are equal to zero (se Kiefer 1988,
pg.674). The tests are equal to 82.88 for Model I and 58.21 for Model II, showing
that the explanatory power of independent variables is highly signiﬁcant.
First of all, results of Table 2 show that individual and team bonuses are
substitute and not complement. In particular, the likelihood of adopting an
incentive scheme based on individual measures of performance is negatively
aﬀected by prior use of team bonuses. The reverse is also true, even though the
coeﬃcient of INDIVIDUAL BONUSES in the team bonuses regression is only
almost signiﬁcant.
Second, the variance on the measure of performance signiﬁcantly impacts
on the probability of adopting monetary incentives. The coeﬃcient of MON-
ITORING TECHNOLOGY is positive in both regressions but signiﬁcant (at
1%) only for team bonuses, while scientiﬁc complexity, i.e. R&D,n e g a t i v e l y
aﬀects the introduction of both kinds of bonus systems.
Innovations in production technology increase the probability of adopting
team and individual monetary incentives, with the coeﬃcient of AMT2 and
AMT34 being positive and signiﬁcant in both regressions. In addition, the
introduction of a bonus system is also favored by prior adoption of HRMPs.
Note also that when a plant’s production is organized by job-shop kinds of
operations, then the introduction of individual bonuses is more likely. The
same does not hold true for team bonuses.
On the contrary, team, but not individual, bonuses are more often introduced
in plants owned by single-plant ﬁrms where the correlation between marginal
product of team eﬀort on ﬁrm value and that on (team) performance measure
is higher with respect to plants owned by multi-plant organizations.
Finally, when is the plant manager who has real authority on plant’s in-
centive procedures then it is more likely that a ﬁrm introduces compensation
schemes based upon measures of individual performance. This result is probably
due to the fact that the plant manager enjoys an information advantage with
1I have also regressed two Weibul models that present similar results. Since the parameter
of Weibul models that rules duration dependence is equal to one, then there is no duration
dependence. In this case Weibul and Exponential models are equivalent.
7respect to his/her superior on the measures of performance. Therefore by both
assigning real responsibility to the plant manager and retaining possible over-
ruling superior will exploit information returns to scale reducing variance on the
measure of performance and minimizes inﬂuence activities of plant employees
who otherwise would try to alter information concerning both plant value and
their performance.
However, it is fair to recognize that PLANT MANAGER does not provide
a complete picture of inﬂuence activities. In particular, plant employees are
very likely to try to inﬂuence the decisions of the plant manager so as to defend
their personal quasi-rents, especially when the plant manager is entitled with
discretionary decision power, a condition which distinguishes situations where
h eo rs h ei si nc h a r g eo fal a r g en u m b e ro fp l a n t ’ ss t r a t e g i cd e c i s i o n s . T h u sI
have proceeded to introduce into the estimates another variable which captures
plant manager’s discretionary power. PM POWER is the proportion of the
following plant’s strategic decisions that are assigned to the plant manager: (i)
purchases of stand-alone machinery, (ii) purchases of large-scale capital equip-
ment, (iii) introduction of new technologies, (iv) hiring and dismissals, and (v)
career paths. Table 3 presents results of the estimates in which PM POWER
has been included. They show that the adoption of monetary incentives is sig-
niﬁcantly more likely not only when the plant manager is assigned responsibility
over plant’s incentives procedures, but also when he or she has no strong discre-
tionary power on other plant’s strategic decisions which are instead centralized
at a hierarchical level outside the plant.
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9Tables
Table 1 - Definitions of Explanatory Variables
Variable name Variable description
Monitoring technology 1 f o rp l a n t st h a tb yy e a rt - 1 had adopted intra-ﬁrm network technology
R&D Proportion of R&D employees to total sector employment (3-digit class.)
Job shop 1 for plants characterized by job shop kinds of operation
AMT11 f o rp l a n t st h a tb yy e a rt - 1 had adopted 1 AMTa
AMT2 1 f o rp l a n t st h a tb yy e a rt - 1 had adopted 2 AMTsa
AMT34 1 f o rp l a n t st h a tb yy e a rt - 1 had adopted 3 or 4 AMTsa
HRMP11 f o rp l a n t st h a tb yy e a rt - 1 had adopted 1 HRMPb
HRMP23 1 f o rp l a n t st h a tb yy e a rt - 1 had adopted 2 or 3 HRMPsb
Plant Manager 1 for plants in which at year t the plant manager is assigned real authority
on the deﬁntion of bonuses
Single-plant 1 for plants owned by single-plant ﬁrms
Size Logarithm of plant employees
Skill Percentage of plant employees with high school leaving certiﬁcate or
higher degree
Unionization Unionization rate (regional value)
Legend:
a AMTs: machining centers, programmable robots, numerically (or computerized nu-
merically) controlled stand-alone machine tools, ﬂexible manufacturing systems.
b HRMPs: job rotation, quality circles, just-in-time.
10Table 2 - Results of exponential duration models
Models
Variablea Team bonuses Individual bonuses
Constant -3.7548 (.4013)∗∗∗ -4.4980 (.6271)∗∗∗
Individual bonusest−1 -.2401 (.1834) –
Team bonusest−1 – -.7455 (.2595)∗∗∗
Monitoring technology .4566 (.1685)∗∗∗ .1002 (.3014)
R&D -3.5807 (1.9872)∗ -9.8189 (4.4092)∗∗
Job shop -.0875 (.1217) .5457 (.1800)∗∗∗
AMT1 .2295 (.1619) -.3224 (.2794)
AMT2 .6213( . 1871)∗∗∗ .2078 (.3377)
AMT34 .7170 (.2438) ∗∗∗ .8086 (.3724)∗∗
HRMP1 .0319( . 1663) -.3896 (.3240)
HRMP23 .5056 (.2067) ∗∗ .5718 (.3386)∗
Single-plant .3365 (.1763)∗ .0638 (.2747)
Plant manager .1704 (.1212) .4101 (.1802)∗∗
Size .1040 (.0650) .0438 (.1072)
Skill .0021 (.0033) .0018( . 0 0 5 1)
Unionization -.0605 (.6214) 1.3135 (.9020)
Number of ﬁrms 438 438
Loglikelihood -1254.047 -688.3391
LR test (degrees of freedom) 82.8780 (14)∗∗∗ 58.2054 (14)∗∗∗
Number of records 6,558 7,942
Legend:
a Standard errors in parentheses.
∗∗∗ Signiﬁcant at the 0.01 level.
∗∗ Signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level.
∗ Signiﬁcant at the 0.10l e v e l .
11Table 3 - Results of exponential duration models
Models
Variablea Team bonuses Individual bonuses
Constant -3.5511 (.4049)∗∗∗ -4.3544 (.6366)∗∗∗
Individual bonusest−1 -.2435 (.1842) –
Team bonusest−1 – -.7457 (.2598)∗∗∗
Monitoring technology .4672 (.1699)∗∗∗ .1000 (.3013)
R&D -3.3004 (1.9955)∗ -9.4234 (4.4827)∗∗
Job shop -.0942 (.1217) .5511 (.1810)∗∗∗
AMT1 .2099 (.1619) -.3527 (.2798)
AMT2 .5901 (.1872)∗∗∗ .2129 (.3382)
AMT34 .7141 (.2446)∗∗∗ .8329 (.3745)∗∗
HRMP1 .0457 (.1665) -.3598 (.3248)
HRMP23 .5418 (.2079)∗∗∗ .5784 (.3390)∗
Single-plant .3635 (.1765)∗∗ .0226 (.2754)
Plant manager .3796 (.1382)∗∗∗ .6438 (.2029)∗∗∗
PM Power -.1208 (.0442)∗∗∗ -.1311 (.0622)∗∗
Size .1020 (.0647) .0716( . 1079)
Skill .0013 (.0033) .0003 (.0050)
Unionization -.2137 (.6243) 1.1786 (.9089)
Number of ﬁrms 438 438
Loglikelihood -1249.9450 -686.8629
LR test (degrees of freedom) 91.08 (15)∗∗∗ 61.1578 (15)∗∗∗
Number of records 6,558 7,942
Legend:
a Standard errors in parentheses.
∗∗∗ Signiﬁcant at the 0.01 level.
∗∗ Signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level.
∗ Signiﬁcant at the 0.10l e v e l .
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